HomeMy WebLinkAbout915333
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RECËlVED 1/19/2006 at 10:43 AM
RECEIVING # 915333
BOOK: 610 PAGE: 97
JEANNE WAGNER
LINCOLN COUNTY CLERK, KEMME~_ER~_,,!,!___
above: line for Recorder use
AFFIDAVIT OF NON CORPORATE STATUS
"Within the Admiralty"
"Within the Admiralty~~ The Admiralty Extension Act~ Title 46 U.S.A. Appendix ch 19-A §740.
TO PUBLIC SERVANTS, (OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS,
DEBTORS OF THE UNITED STATES for the United States of America)
1. A matter must be expressed to be resolved. 2. In Commerce, Truth is sovereign.
3. Truth is expressed in the form of an Affidavit. 4. An un-rebutted Affidavit stands as Truth in
Commerce. 5. An un-rebutted Affidavit becomes the judgment in Commerce.
NOTICE: This Affidavit was not written for the purpose of debating the constitutionality or legality of
any Law or Act, but rather to establish facts declaring Affiant's status and revealing the United States
Government's lack of jurisdiction over Affiant. UNLESS THESE AFFIRMATIONS AND
DECLARATIONS ARE REBUTTED POINT BY POINT THEY STAND AS WITNESS TO
AFFIANT Dorenda Leigh Price Jones' STATUS.
Affiant Dorenda Leigh Price Jones, being of sound mind and competent to make this affidavit with
personal knowledge of the infonnation and facts contained herein and in attesting to said facts in
Affiant's authorized capacity, Declares and Affinns:
1. That Affiant is not a "United States Person", "United States Resident", "U.S. Individual", "U.S.
Corporation" or "U.S. citizen" subjected to its jurisdiction, or any other such "words of art" corporation
created under the laws of the United States or any state of the Union States, the STATE OF
WYOMING, the District of Columbia, or any territory, commonwealth: or possession of the United
States or a foreign state or country, public or private.
2. That Affiant is not a 'resident of', 'inhabitant of', 'franchisee of', 'subject of', 'ward of', 'property
of', 'chattel of', 'officer of', 'agent of', 'shareholder of', 'franchise or fiduciary agent of', 'surety of',
'resident inhabitant of', 'domiciled in any corporation of', nor 'an enemy of' as defined in the War and
emergency powers act of 1933, or 'subject to the jurisdiction of' the State of the Forum of the United
States, corporate State, corporate County, corporate City, or Municipal body politic created under the
primary authority of Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 and Art. IV, Sec. 3, CI. 2 of the Constitution for the
United States of America and not subject to any legislation created by or under the jurisdiction of any
employees, officers, or agents deriving their authority thereof. Further, Affiant is not a subject of the
Administrative and Legislative Article I Courts or bound by precedents of such courts created by the
"United States". "Legislation enacted by Congress applicable to the inferior courts in the exercise of
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the power under Article III of the Constitution cannot be affected by legislation enacted by Congress
under Art. L Sec. 8, CI 17, of the Constitution." D.C. Code, Title 11 at p. 13.
3. That Affiànt hereby revokes and cancels all of Affiant's signatures on any other forms, which may
be construed to give the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF mSTICE or any other agency or
department of the United States Government created from Article 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 17 and Article IV, Sec.
3, Cl. 2, of the Constitution for the United States authority or jurisdiction over Affiant. Affiant also
revokes, rescinds, and makes void from the beginning (ab initio), all powers of attorney, in fact, in
presumption, express, implied, or otherwise, signed by Affiant or anyone else, with or without full
disclosure, or Affiant's consent, as such power of attorney pertains to Affiant, by, but not limited to,
any and all government/quasi/colorable, public, private, Government entities or corporations, on the
grounds of constructive fraud, unauthorized (ultra vires) for non-disclosure of pertinent facts ab initio.
4. That Affiant is not a vessel documented under Chapter 121 of Title 46 United States Code or a
vessel numbered as provided in Chapter 123 of said Title.
5. That Affiant hereby cancels any presumed election made with the United States Government or any
agency or department thereof, that Affiant is not nor ever has been a citizen, alien citizen, or resident of
any territory, possession, instrumentality or enclave, under the sovereignty or exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States, as defined in the Constitution for the United States of America in Art. I, Sec. 8, CI.
17, and Art. IV, Sec. 3, CI. 2. Affiant further rebuts any presumption that Affiant ever voluntarily
elected to be treated as such a citizen or resident ab initio.
6. That Affiant is not an enemy òf the United States or any corporation created under the laws of the
United States, or any state of the Union States, the District of Columbia, or any territory,
commonwealth, or possession of the United States, or a foreign state, or country, public or private.
7. Any presumption that the Affiant is any of the above or documentation implying any of the above,
is not the act or intention of this Affiant and any such presumption or documentation is fraudulent,
illusionary, false representation of a matter of fact, or a kind of artifice employed by one person to
deceive another for self-serving purposes.
8. That Affiant's Christian and Family name, Dorenda Leigh Price Jones, and living location near
89796 Highway 89, Grover, Lincoln County, Wyoming, are particularly unique to this Affiant, is not
affiliated with the "Corporate Body Politic" near the same location, and suffices as complete,
necessary, and sufficient identification evidencing Affiant's neutral standing (15 USC 1681h).
9. Affiant is not a pirate or an enemy or affiliated with an enemy of any public or private municipal
corporation, domestic or foreign. Any past or future reference to Affiant as such by any government
agency and its officer(s) will be considered "a Libel, a tort, and defamation of character" and will be
litigated as such in the jurisdiction where said agents have no immunity, "Within the Admiralty" 28
U.S.C §§ 1333 or 1337, Bills oflading Act, The Public Vessel Act, Foreign Sòvereign immunity Act,
False Claims Act, see 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(7) and Federal Tort Claims Act.
10. None of the facts or Laws presented herein are contrary to any Court decisions applicable to
Affiant. All facts contained herein are based upon ruling case law and un-overruled decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. None of these facts have been found to be "frivolous" by any court when
2
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argued in their exact and proper context. These are technical facts that, under Commercial Law, must
be rebutted with "case law" or acquiesced to. <
11. Any statèments or claims in this Affidavit properly rebutted by facts of law, or overriding Article
III Supreme Court rulings, shall not prejudice the lawful validity of other claims not properly rebutted
or invalidated by facts oflaw. Therefore, an Affidavit of Truth, under Commercial Law, can only be
satisfied: (i) through a rebuttal Affidavit of Truth, point for point, (ii) by payment, (iii) by agreement,
(iv) by resolution by a jury by the rules of Common Law.
12. That the following affidavit is an inseparable part of this Affidavit of Non-Corporate status and
explains why this Affidavit and Declaration is necessary for declaring Affiant's true non-corporate
status.
AFFIDAVIT AND DECLARATION CONCERNING INAPPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXES TO Dorenda Leigh Price Jones, A Natural Human Being and not a
Corporation or Corporate Person
PUBLIC NOTICE: This continuing Document, an integral part of the above AFFIDAVIT OF
NON CORPORATE STATUS, describes Constitutional protections and Supreme Court
interpretations in pursuance thereof, which conclusively derme the lack of authority, scope, and
application of federal taxes as applied to Affiant. Affiant, Dorenda Leigh Price Jones, is a
Natural Human Being and not a Corporation or Corporate person. This document is in the
form of a Report on these applicable Constitutional protections and Supreme Court rulings.
The First Consideration - The Constitution
The Constitution of the United States forbids the imposition by the federal government of a direct tax
without apportioning it in accordance with the census. The first thing to consider is what constitutes a
direct tax and what apportionment means.
The subject of what constitutes a direct tax has been addressed by the Supremè Court in several cases
and in the laws. Affiant has examined these cases and has examined what the Court said concerning the
16th Amendment, the "Income Tax" amendment.
It is understood that there are some basic principles oflaw. One important principle is that because a
case is old does not mean that it is invalid or not reliable. It is exactly the opposite. An old case, which
has never been successfully challenged nor overturned, is the best of all cases as having withstood the
test of time and becomes part of our common law.
There are other principles which must be considered, such as, a natural human being does not have to
do what an IRS agent tells him to do, he only has to do what the law tells him to do. The law is
expressed by Constitution, court ruling, statute, and regulation. In order for a statute to have the force
of law, there must be an accompanying implementing regulation.
"The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other,
and only together do they have any force. In effect, therefore, the construction of one
necessarily involves the construction of the other... When the statute and regulations are
so inextricably intertwined, the dismissal must be held to involve the construction of the
statute. H UNITED STATES v. MERSKY, 361 U.S. 431, 438 (1960).
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"... we think it important to note that the Act'scivi/ and criminal penalties attach only
upon violation of regulations promulgated by the Secretary; if the Secretary were to do
nothing, the Act itselfwould impose no penalties on anyone. H CALIFORNIA
BANKERS ASSN. v. SHULTZ, 416 U.S. 21, 26 (1974).
Sometimes a regulation is overturned by a court ruling on the basis that the regulation did not properly
reflect the statute. There are 3 types of regulations; Interpretive, Procedural, and Legislative. An agency
can have a regulation demanding that employees shine their shoes or wash their hands. These obviously
would not have the force and effect of law but would only be a condition of employment. There are
also interpretive regulations that guide the employees in their work. The last type of regulation is the
legislative regulation, which has the force and effect of law only by the citation of a statute or ruling on
which it is based. At the end of each regulation there are a number of citations, such as a Treasury
Department Decision, etc. The regulation must cite a statute, such as 26 USC Sec. 6331, in order to
have the force and effect of law and application.
So one of the main considerations would be to question any statement made by an IRS agent or
gove111IÚent official as to whether a regulation has the force and effect of law. A Supreme Court case
states a principle that is a key to detennining the authority and jurisdiction of an alleged government
agent. That ruling was given in Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v Merrill, 332 US 380, 384 (1947) and
has never been overturned:
"Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an
arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that
he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The
scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated
legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even
though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his
authority. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 Us. 389. 409. 391;
United States v. Stewart, 311 US. 60. 70. 108, and see, generally, In re Floyd
Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666. H
Based on the above, Affiant will not accept any communication with an alleged government agent
unless proper documentation is provided proving the" bounds of his authority". The "scope of
this authority" must "be explicitly defined by Congress" in the documentation presented to Affiant,
backed up by Law, Statute, Regulation, or Rule applicable to Affiant. If the alleged agent's statement is
incorrect or deceptive then he may be committing fraud and may be held accountable before an earthly
tribunal, and will surely be held accountable before a Heavenly tribunal.
In the Constitution, the prohibitions against a direct tax are:
Article 1, sec. 2, "Representatives and direct taxes shall be avvortioned among the
several States which may be included in this union, according to their respective
Numbers... H and also in Article 1, sec. 9, "No Cavitation. or other direct. Tax shall be
laid unless in vrovortion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be
taken. H
These 2 prohibitions were never repealed and remain in force in the main body of the Constitution. The
income tax is a direct tax on an individual and must be levied under the rule of apportionment,
according to the Supreme Court. However, there actually was levied an excise tax on corporations, in
1909 and later, which was measured by the size of their incomes and limited by their profits. That tax
cannot be levied on a natural human being in the private sector.
4
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"Direct Taxes bear upon persons, upon possession and the enjoyment of
rights; Indirect Taxes are levied upon the happening of an event. "
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 US 41, 47 (1900).
The Code of Federal Regulations cites direct and indirect taxes in 19 CFR 351.102 Definitions:
Direct tax. ''Direct tax" means a tax on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all
other forms of income, a tax on the ownership of real property, or a social welfare
charge.
Indirect tax. "Indirect tax" means a sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise,
stamp, transfer, inventory, or equipment tax, a border tax, or any other tax other than a
direct tax or an import charge.
Affiant's possessions include the money, assets, and property in Affiant's possession, and also include
Affiant's labor as being Affiant's property as ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court also ruled
that Affiant's labor is inviolable and the exercise of such is a guaranteed right.
"The common business and callings of life, the ordinary trades and pursuits, which are
innocuous in themselves, and have been followed in all communities from time
immemorial, must therefore be free in this country to all alike upon the same conditions.
The right to pursue them, without let or hindrance, except that which is applied to all
persons of the same age, sex, and condition, is a distinguishing privilege of citizens of
the United States, and an essential element of that freedom which they claim as their
birthright. It has been well said that 'the property which every man has in his own labor,
as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and
inviolable. The patrimony of the poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his own
hands, and to hinder his employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks
proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation of this most sacred property.
It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who
might be disposed to employ him. " Butcher's Union Co. v. Cresent City Co., 111 US
746, 757 (I884).
[:00101
"... using of anything whereby any verson or versons. bodies volitic or corporate. are
sought to be restrained of any freedom or liberty they had before or hindered in their
lawful trade. ' All grants of this kind are void at common law. because they destroy the
freedom of trade, discourage labor and industry, restrain persons from getting an
honest livelihood, and put it in the power of the grantees to enhance the price of
commodities. They are void because they interfere with the liberty of the individual to
vursue a lawful trade or employment. " Butcher's Union Co. v. Cresent City Co., III US
746, 756 (1884).
"That the right to conduct a lawful business. and thereby acquire pecuniary profits, is
vroverty. is indisputable." TRUAX v. CORRIGAN, 257 U.S. 312, 348 (1921).
In Sims v, Ahrens, 167Ark. 557,271 S.W. 720, 733 (1925):
"Tlhe Legislature has no vower to declare as a vrivilege and tax for revenue purvoses
occuvations that are of common right. but it does have the power to declare as
privileges and tax as such for state revenue purposes those pursuits and occupations
that are not matters of common right... "
MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923):
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"While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt. it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occuvations
of life. to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v.
Crescent City Co., 111 Us. 746. 4 Sup. Ct. 652; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 Us. 356. 6
Sup. Ct. 1064; Minnesota v. Bar er, 136 Us. 313 . 10 Sup. Ct. 862; Allegeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 Us. 578 . 17 Sup. Ct. 427; Lochner v. New York, 198 Us. 45 . 25 Sup.
Ct. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Twining v. New Jersey 211 Us. 78.29 Sup. Ct. 14; Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 Us. 549. 31 Sup. Ct. 259; Truax v. Raich, 239 Us. 33 .
36 Sup. Ct. 7, 1. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Adams v. Tanner, 224 Us.
590. 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 1. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dodge, 246 Us. 357.38 Sup. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 593; 'fruaxv. Corrigan,
257 Us. 312 . 42 Sup. Ct. 124; Adkins v. Children's Hospital (April 9, 1923), 261 Us.
525.43 Sup. Ct. 394, 671. Ed. --; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474,
86 N E. 925, 128 Am. St. Rep. 439, 23 1. R. A. (N. s.) 147. n
"A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal
. Constitution. " MURDOCK v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 319 US
105, at 113; 63 S Ct at 875; 87 L Ed at 1298 (1943).
So what is an excise tax?
''A tax laid upon the happening of an event, as distinguished from its tangible fruit, is an
Indirect Tax which Congress undoubtedly may impose. " Tyler et. aI., Administrators v.
United States, 281 US 497, 502 (1930).
If the tax were being imposed as an excise tax on a natural person, why is the tax imposed not listed in
subtitle E (Alcohol, tobacco, and certain excise taxes)?
Excise taxes used to be commonly referred to as luxury taxes. The basis for that was that an excise tax
was levied on an item of consumption or a privilege, which could be avoided by the buyer or
subscriber. Very few people refer to excise taxes as luxury taxes anymore because the establishment
would not want this concept to take root in the public mind. Many citizens would disagree with the
notion that telephones or gasoline are not necessities of life and can be avoided, thereby rendering them
as luxuries.
Affiant, Dorenda Leigh Price Jones, hereby Declares and Affirms that Affiant's Right, "the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life" is inviolate and
'~ state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution. "
The Constitution so states and the Supreme Court has upheld my, Affiant's, right to labor
without a tax on the fruits of that labor.
The Second Consideration - The 16th Amendment
The Internal Revenue Service claims that the 16th Amendment to the Constitution authorizes an income
tax without apportionment. That is only partially true. The Amendment only applies to corporate
profits, not to an unincorporated natural human being or a private business, as the following Court
6
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rulings will prove.
After the 16th Amendment was passed in 1913 there were many cases that came before the US Supreme
Court and various issues were decided concerning its legitimacy. Note: Affiant is NOT arguing the
ratification or non-ratification of the 16th Amendment. There is a large group that is claiming that the
16th Amendment was never properly ratified and that argument is hard to dispùte, but is a moot point in
light of the Supreme Court's rulings which say that the 16th Amendment "conferred no new power of
taxation". The big question was whether the Amendment had overturned the limitations against a
direct tax without apportionment, since the limitations on direct taxes remain in the Constitution. In
other words, the 'no direct tax without apportionment' language had not been repealed in the
Constitution as part of the Amendment process. There was the landmark Pollock case that had set
precedent before the 16th Amendment was passed. Pollock came before the court in 1895 and argued
what an indirect and direct tax were. It overturned the 1894 income tax act because of lack of
apportionment. Obviously the apportionment provision is very important.
"Nothing can be clearer than that what the constitution intended to guard against was
the exercise by the general government of the power of directly taxing persons and
property within any state through a majority made up from the other states. " Pollock vs.
Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 US 429, 582 (1895).
"Thus, in the matter of taxation, the constitution recognizes the two great classes of
direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their imposition must be
governed, namely, the rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of
uniformity as to duties, imposts, and excises. " Pollock, 157 US 429, 556 (1895).
"From the foregoing it is apparent (1) that the distinction between direct and indirect
taxation was well understood by the framers of the constitution and those who adopted
it; (2) that, under the state system of taxation, all taxes on real estate or personal
property or the rents or income thereof were regarded as direct taxes; (3) that the rules
of apportionment and of uniformity were adopted in view of that distinction and those
systems... " Pollock, 157 US 429, 573.
"The income tax law under consideration is marked by discriminatingjeatures which
affect the whole law. It discriminates between those who receive an income of$4,000
and those who do not. It thus vitiates, in my judgment, by this arbitrary discrimination,
the whole legislation. "Pollock, 157 US 429, 595.
In 1909, a corporate excise tax was passed and was ruled as meeting the requirement of uniformity for
excise taxes. The court said that the apportionment requirement was not needed because it was an
excise tax on the privilege of incorporating and the size of the excise tax was measured by the size of
the corporate profit. Therefore, it was ruled that it was not a tax on the income of the corporation and
was, in actuality, an indirect or excise tax. It was a privilege to incorporate and that privilege carried
some advantages with it. Therefore the excise tax could be avoided by not incorporating. That allowed
it to fall into the category of excise or luxury tax. The tax was only allowed on corporations and not on
individuals. Corporate officers were obligated to ensure that the corporation paid the tax but the tax
was not imposed on the individual officers.
Note STRATTON'S INDEPENDENCE, LTD. v. HOWBERT, 231 U.S. 399,417 (1913):
"Evidently Congress adopted the income as the measure of the tax to be imposed with
respect to the doing of business in corporate form because it desired that the excise
should be imposed, approximately at least, with regard to the amount of benefit
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presumably derived by such corporations from the current operations of the government.
In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 US. 107, 165,55 S. 1. ed 107,419, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep.
342, Ann. Cas. 1912 B. 1312, it was held that Congress, in exercising the rightto tax a
legitimate subject of taxation as afranchise or privilege, was not debarred by the
Constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income, although derived in part
from propertv which. considered bv itself. was not taxable. "
In FLINT v. STONE TRACY CO., 220 U.S. 107, 165 (1911), this is also stated:
"It is therefore well settled by the decisions of this court that when the sovereign
authority has exercised the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as an exercise of
afranchise or privilege, It is no objection that the measure of taxation is found in the
income produced in part from prooerty which of itself considered is nontaxable.
Applying that doctrine to this case, the measure of taxation being the income of the
corporation from all sources, as that is but the measure of a privilege tax within the
lawful authority of Congress to impose, it is no valid objection that this measure
includes, in part, at least, prooerty which. as such. could not be direct Iv taxed See, in
this connection, Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 142 US. 217.351. ed 994, 3 Inters.
Com. Rep. 807, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121, 163, as interpreted in Galveston, H & s. A. R. Co.
v. Texas, 210 Us. 217. 226.52 S. 1. ed 1031, 1037,28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638. n
In the above, the Court said that Property, (a person's labor or wages), considered by itself, is not
taxable.
The Sixteenth Amendment states:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration. n
Without considering the definition of the word "income" given by the US Supreme Court, it will
appear as though the 16th Amendment canceled out the two taxing clauses in the main body of the
Constitution. The scope of the 16th Amendment is limited to "income" as defined by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
In Brushaber, 240 US 1, 12, the Court recognized the apparent conflict between the main body of the
Constitution and the 16th Amendment and stated the several contentions being made in the case and
ruled: .
"... the contentions under it (the 1 ~h Amendment), if acceded to, would cause one
provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing
the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into
irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned.
'" This result, instead of simplifYing the situation and making clear the limitations on
the taxing power ... would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional
system and multiply confusion. n
The High Court was faced with coming up with a resolution between the apparent conflict between the
two taxing clauses in the main body of the Constitution and the 16th Amendment. It didn't have the
power to overturn those two taxing clauses but it did have the power to overturn the 16th Amendment as
being unconstitutional. It cited the limitation of the authority of the 16th Amendment by clarifying the
limitations on the word "income" in the 16th Amendment. In the following cases the Court made this
limitation as being an indirect tax (excise tax) placed on an activity or privilege of incorporation and
8
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consequent activities as a corporation, the size of such excise tax being measured by the size of the
corporate profit. The word "income" in its constitutional sense was ruled as having no other meaning
than as being an indirect (excise) tax, the same as was levied by the 1909 corporate tax act.
The 1954 House Discussion on Code section 61(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code states:
"This definition is based upon the 1 (lh Amendment and the word 'income' is used in its
constitutional sense. " "This section corresponds to section 22 (a) of the 1939 Code. "
A number of other cases came up after the 16th Amendment was allegedly passed in 1913, and they all
remained consistent and only had to reconcile minor differences, such as mining as opposed to
manufacturing. This is where the crux of the matter lies for the income tax issue. All these courts
clearly ruled, especially MERCHANT'S LOAN & TRUST CO. v SMIETANKA, 255 US 509 (1921),
that the word "income" had a specific legal meaning in the 16th Amendment. They further pointed to
STRATTON'S INDEPENDENCE, LTD. v HOWBERT, 231 US 399 (1913) as the ruling that defined
the word "income" in the 16th Amendment.
Here is what STRATTON'S 231 US 399,414-415 says:
"As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to
be and is not, in any proper sense, an income tax law. This court had decided in the
Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon
property, and was invalid because not apportioned accordinf! to populations. as
prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not
an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity,
measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation. "
The important key is "upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity". So the court is saying
that;
1) Individual income taxes are direct taxes because they tax the property of the individual,
2) Corporate income taxes are not taxes on the corporation's income but an excise tax on the
corporate privilege and measured by the size of the corporation's income, and
3) Any federal tax on true "income" would be unconstitutional, if not apportioned.
In US v. WHITRIDGE, 231 U.S. 144, 147 (1913), the Court ruled:
"As repeatedly pointed out by this court, the corporation tax law of 1909-enacted, as it
was, after Congress had proposed to the legislatures of the several states the adoption of
the 16th Amendment to the Constitution, but before the ratification of that Amendment-
imposed an excise or privilege tax, and not in any sense a tax upon property or upon
income merely as income. It was enacted in view of the decision of this court in Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 Us. 429, 391. ed 759, 15 Sup. Sf. Rep. 673, 158 Us.
601,391. ed 1108, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912, which held the income tax provisions ofa
previous law (act of August 27, 1894, 28 Stat. at 1. chap. 349, pp. 509, 553, 27 etc. U S.
Compo Stat. 1901, p. 2260) to be unconstitutional because amountinf! in effect to a direct
tax upon property within the meaning of the Constitution. and because not apportioned
in the manner required bv that instrument. "
The only way they could levy a tax on corporations would be to levy an excise tax but not a tax on
income itself. Can they levy an excise tax, measured by the size of Affiant's earnings, on Affiant's
salary? Does Affiant have the same choice that a corporation has, that is, to work or not to work? No!
Affiant must work to feed self and family. The right to work is not a privilege. Government officials
9
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and their official literature state that the income tax is done in voluntary compliance. Further, the head
of the ATF officially testified, under oath before Congress in 1954, that the income tax was 100%
voluntary. He was never charged with perjury nor did any member of Congress challenge his statement
under oath.
Affiant declares that Affiant is NOT a corporation subject to a corporate "income tax".
THE INCOME TAX and THE 16TI1 AMENDMENT
Affiant has researched some Supreme Court rulings and a discussion of direct vs. indirect taxes. These
rulings are a part of our "common law".
POLLOCK v FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST CO., 157 US 429, 442,555 (1895) made the following
rulings:
Quoting the Constitution - "No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in
proportion to the census.... n
"If', ruled Chief Justice Marshall, "both the law and the constitution apply to a
particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law,
disregarding the constitution, or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law,
the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. n And the
Chief Justice added that the doctrine "that courts must close their eyes on the
constitution, and see only the law, would subvert the very foundation of all written
constitutions. n
Thus. the Constitution must govern the law.
Speaking of the 1894 tax, POLLOCK at 555, stated:
"... that such tax is a direct tax, and void because imposed without regard to the rule of
apportionment; and that by reason thereof the whole law is invalidated. n Second, "That
the law is invalid, because imposing indirect taxes in violation of the constitutional
requirement of uniformity, and there.in also in violation of the implied limitation upon
taxation that all tdx laws must apply equally, impartially, and uniformly to all similarly
situated. n
As the court ruled, there are two great classes of taxation authorized under the constitution, direct _
under the rule of apportionment, and indirect - under the rule of uniformity. The corporate income tax
is an indirect (excise) tax while the individual income tax is a direct tax, which must be apportioned.
The two differ in nature, character, and application.
Since the 1894 tax and the present individual income tax are both done without apportionment, they are
unconstitutional if they are direct taxes and ifthev are mandatorily imposed. The 1894 direct tax was
ruled invalid, so how about our present day individual income tax? The Supreme Court's rulings on
the 16th Amendment shed some light on the Apportionment requirement. The IRS is obliged to answer
this question in specific detail and without evasive answers.
Pollock further stated:
"As to the states and their municipalities, this (contributions to expense of government)
is reached largely through the imposition of direct taxes. As to the federal government, it
is attained in part through excises and indirect taxes upon luxuries and consumption
generally, to which direct taxation may be added to the extent the rule of apportionment
10
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allows. " And "If, by calling a tax indirect when it is essentially direct, the rule of
protection could be frittered away, one of the great landmarks defining the boundary
between the nation and the states of which it is composed, would have disappeared, and
with ii one of the bulwarks of private rights and private property. "
This ruling maintains the distinction between types of state and federal taxation as being important and
necessary. Also notice the description of excise (indirect) taxes as taxes on "luxuries and
consumption." These indirect taxes fall on the sales of luxuries and consumer goods, which can be
avoided. Also the ability to avoid these indirect taxes by not purchasing taxed products or by not
seeking a corporate privilege, is necessary to the conditions required by Pollack. Also privileges, such
as incorporation, are taxable because they are avoidable and are therefore voluntary. Where have we
heard that word "voluntary" before? The IRS gives notice each time it refers to "voluntary
compliance".
Further, it is stated in:
Taxation Key, West 53 - "The legislature cannot name something to be a taxable
privilege unless it is first a privilege. "
Taxation Key, West 933 - "The Right to receive income Or earnings is a right belonging
to every person and realization and receipts of income is therefore not a ''privilege that
can be taxed".
FLINT v STONE TRACY,220 US 107, 151-152, (1911):
"Excises are 'taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities
within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain occupations, and upon corporate
privileges. ' Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 680."
The above case defines excise taxes. Affiant declares, again, that Affiant is NOT a corporate entity
upon which excise taxes can be laid.
In US v. WHITRIDGE, 231 U.S. 144, 147 (1913), the Court ruled:
"As repeatedly pointed out by this court, the corvoration tax law of 1909-enacted, as it
was, after Congress had proposed to the legislatures of the several states the adoption of
the 16th Amendment to the Constitution, but before the ratification of that Amendment-
imposed an excise or vrivilege tax, and not in any sense a tax upon vroverty or upon
income merely as income. "
Now let's look at ·Smietanka in 1921,8 years after the 16th Amendment was passed.
MERCHANTS' LOAN & TRUST CO. v SMIETANKA, 255 US 509, 519 (1921):
"The Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909, was not an income tax law, but a
definition of the word 'income' was so necessary in its administration.:. "
"It is obvious that these decisions in principle rule the case at bar if the word 'income'
has the same meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had in the Corporation
Excise Tax Act of 1909, and that it has the same scope of meaning was in effect decided
in Southern Pacific v Lowe ..., where it was assumed for the purpose of decision that
there was no difference in its meaning as used in the act of 1909 and in the Income Tax
Act of 1913. There can be no doubt that the word must be given the same meaning and
content in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the act of 1913. When we
add to this, Eisner v Macomber... the definition of 'income' which was applied was
adopted from Stratton's Independence v Howbert, supra, arising under the Corporation
11
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Excise Tax Act of 1909... there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be
given the same meaning in all the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in
the Corporation Excise Tax Act. and that what that meaning is has now become
definitely settled by decisions of this Court. ..
So the word "income". in its constitutional sense. has the same meaning after the 16th Amendment was
passed as it did µrior to passage in 1913. Since that time there has never been an overturning of this
decision which was definitely settled by that Supreme Court decision in 1921.1f the IRS cannot show
that the decision of the Court was overturned, then its claims on Affiant fail.
All these rulings were made to establish the meaning of the word 'income' in the 16th Amendment.
The case of STRATTON'S INDEPENDENCE, LTD.v HOWBERT, 231 US 399, 414-415, (1913) is
very important in that it puts a finner definition on the word "income".
"As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909 was not intended to
be and is not, in anv vrover sense, an income tax law, This court had decided in the
Pollock Case that the income tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon
property, and was invalid because not apportioned according to populations, as
prescribed by the Constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty by imposing not
an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct of business in a corporate capacity,
measuring, however, the amount of tax by the income of the corporation, with certain
qualifications prescribed by the act itself"
"Moreover, the section imposes 'a special excise tax with respect to the carrying on or
doing business by such corporation, ' etc... ..
"Corporations engaged in such business share in the benefits of the federal government,
and ought as reasonably to contribute to the support of that government as corporations
that conduct other kinds of profitable business. ..
"... the annual gains of such corporations are certainly to be taken as income for the
purpose of measuring the amount of the tax. ..
So the Court ruled the word 'income' only applied to corporations, acting in a corporate capacity,
which freely entered into a contract with the federal government to incorporate and were free to not
incorporate or to rescind their incorporation. It was an excise tax and was indirect and was imposed on
a privilege or luxury. The Court ruled that excise taxes cannot be imposed on an individual or his
property. The Apportionment provision of the Constitution has never been repealed and still stands in
the main body of the Constitution.
If a person voluntarily states on a W -4 or on a "1040 fonn" that he had "income", the government will
oblige that statement and collect an "income tax". However, if a person is forced to sign a W -4 in
order to support himself and his family, that W-4 is not legally valid and is compelled by coercion and
under duress, therefore it is fraud.
Affiant understands by the above rulings that the income tax can be voluntary and this is crucial to the
understanding as to why it might be considered constitutional, that is, not authorized by the constitution
but simply pennitted if it is voluntarily undertaken between government and Affiant.
Affiant declares that any prior forms which Affiant signed or declarations made implying that
Affiant has voluntarily entered into a contract or agreement declaring having "income" subject
to taxation was done in ignorance, was not done voluntarily, and was in error, and is therefore
null and void and is rescinded.
12
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Fourth Consideration - SUPREME COURT CASES
Three court rulings; Pollock, Stratton's Independence, and Smietanka, standing alone and of
themselves, destroy the federal government's claim that the 16th Amendment authorized an income tax
on individuals and unincorporated businesses. Some may object on the grounds that perhaps Affiant's
report and Declaration is not telling the whole story or perhaps misinterpreting these cases. Now it is
time to lay those objections to rest. Affiant presents several other US Supreme Court cases which
affinn.
EVANS v GORE, 253 US 245 (1920):
"If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can find no justification in the
taxation of other income as to which there is no prohibition; for, of course, doing what
the Constitution permits gives no license to do what it prohibits. H
"Does the Sixteenth Amendment authorize and support this tax and the attendant
diminution; that is to say, does it bring within the taxing powers subjects theretofore
excepted? The court below answered in the negative; and counsel for the government
say: 'It is not. in view of recent decisions, contended that this amendment rendered
anvthing taxable as income that was not so taxable before '. H
BOWERS v. KERBAUGH-EMPlRE CO., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926):
"The Sixteenth Amendment declares that Congress shall have power to levy and collect
taxes on income, 'from whatever source derived' without apportionment among the
several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration. It was not the purvose
or effect of that amendment to bring anv new subiect within the taxing power. H
Even the government is not claiming, in view of those recent decisions, that it can levy a direct tax
without apportionment. Remember that this was 7 years after the Sixteenth Amendment was passed.
DOYLE v. MITCHELL BROS. CO., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918):
"Whatever difficulty there may be about a precise and scientific definition of'income,' it
imports, as used here, something entirely distinct from principal or capital either as a
subject of taxation Or as a measure of the tax; conveving rather the idea of gain or
increase arising trom corvo rate activities. H
FLORA v US, 362 US 145 (1960):
"Our system of taxation is based upon voluntarv assessment andpavmènt. not upon
distraint. H
Definition of distraint in the legal dictionary, "to seize a person's goods as security for an obligation. n
STANTON v BALTIC MINING CO., 240 US 103 (1916):
"Not being within the authority of the 16th Amendment, the tax is therefore, within the
ruling of Pollock... a direct tax and voidfor want of compliance with the regulation of
apportionment. H
"... it manifestly disregards the fact that by the previous ruling it was settled that the
provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation.. H
"... it was settled in Stratton's Independence... that such tax is not a tax upon property...
but a true excise levied on the result of the business. H
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The quotes above deal with the fact that the 16th Amendment authorizes an excise tax on corporations
and that the Apportionment provision was still active after the passage of the 16th Amendment.
BRUSHABER v UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 US 1 (1916):
" ... the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the 16th
Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation,' that is, a power to levy
an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to the regulation of
apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this
erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions
advanced in argument to support it... "
"... the whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed
from apportionment from a consideration of the source... "
"... on the contrary shows that it was drawn with the object of maintaining the
limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing their operation. "
The first quote states that it is erroneous to believe that a power to levy an income tax, without
Apportionment, was granted by the 16th Amendment.
In TAFT v. BOWERS, 278 U.S. 470, 481 (1929):
"Under former decisions here the settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth Amendment
confers no power upon Congress to define and tax as income without . apportionment
something which theretofore could not have been properly regarded as income. "
PECK v LOWE, 247 US 165 (1918):
"As pointed out in recent decisions, it does not extend the taxing power to new or
excepted sub;ects... "
Here the Court is not only saying that the 16th Amendment conferred no new powers of taxation, but
also that the 16th Amendment did not authorize that taxing powers be extended to any new persons.
EISNER v MACOMBER, 252 US 189 (1920):
"The 16th Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of the
original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before the amendment was
adopted"
"As repeatedly held this did not extend the taxing power to new sub;ects... "
"... it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and is not 'income', as the term is
there used. "
"... we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the
Corporation Tax Act of 1909... (Stratton's and Doyle) "
DOYLE v. MITCHELL BROS., 247 U.S. 179,183 (1918):
''An examination of these and other provisions of the Act (The 16'h Amendment) make it
plain that the legislative purpose was not to tax TJroperty as such, or the mere conversion
of property, but to tax the conduct of the business of corporations organized for profit
upon the gainful returns from their business operations. " .
The "conversion of property" mentioned· applied to work/property converted to
remuneration! compensation.
COPPAGE v. STATE OF KANSAS, 236 U.S. 1,23 -24 (1915):
14
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"The court held it unconstitutional, saying: 'The right to follow any lawful vocation and
to make contracts is as completely within the protection of the Constitution as the right
to hold property free from unwarranted seizure, or the liberty to go when and where one
will. One of the ways of obtaining property is by contract. The right, therefore, to
contract cannot be infringed by the legislature without violating the letter and spirit of
the Constitution. Every citizen is protected in his right to work where and for whom he
will. He may select not only his employer, but also his associates. "
SMIET ANKA, as in the 3rd consideration of my Report, states:
"There would seem to be no room to doubt that the word 'income' must be given the
same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in the
Corporation Excise Tax Act, and what that meaning is has now becom~ definitely settled
by decisions of this Court. "
BOWERS v. KERBAUGH-EMPIRE, 271 U.S. 170 (1926):
"Income has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax
Act of 1909, in the 16th Amendment, and in the various revenue acts subsequently
passed"
HELVERING v. EDISON BROS. STORES, 8 Cir. 133 F2d 575 (1943):
"The Treasury cannot by interpretive regulation make income of that which is not
income within the meaning of the revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress. without
apportionment. tax that which is not income within the meaning of the 16th
Amendment. "
SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. v. LOWE, 247 U.S. 330, 335 (1918):
"We must re;ect in this case, as we have rejected in cases arising under the Corporation
Excise Tax Act of 1909, the broad contention submitted on behalf of the flovernment that
all receipts. everything that comes in, are income within the proper definition of the term
'gross income'. Certainly the term 'income' has no broader meaning in the Income Tax
Act of 1913 than in that of 1909, and for the present purpose we assume there is no
difference in its meaning as used in the two acts. "
If the word "income" in the 16th Amendment has a strictly limited meaning, as'stated in Stratton's
Independence, then the 16th Amendment cannot be properly understood unless that definition, with its
limitations, is taken into account.
One set of claims that the IRS makes is to say that section 61 or section 63 of the Internal Revenue
Code provides the definition of "income" that applies equally to individuals and corporations. Could it
ever be possible that the same definition would apply to a corporation excise tax and equally so to a
direct tax on an individual's earnings? Since the tax imposed on a corporation was ruled to be an
indirect tax and an excise tax imposed on a corporate activity, the question must be raised asto which
of the two classes of taxation authorized by the Constitution is imposed on a natural human being, such
as Affiant? Is it an excise tax imposed on a privilege of incorporation? A natural human being does not
partake in that privilege. And since the 1894 tax imposed on corporations' income, as a direct tax, was
invalid due to lack of Apportionment, so also the individual and his property also cannot be taxed
directly due to lack of Apportionment.
Further, the Supreme Court affirmed the previous cases in 1976, in U.S. v. Ballard, 535 F2d 400:
"Gross income and not 'gross receipts' is the foundation of income tax liability..." Here the Court
15
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makes a distinction between the two and the distinction is based on the word "income" as previously
decided by the Court.
There is also the fact that the Supreme Court has ruled that "income" is not defined in the Internal
Revenue Code, as stated below:
EISNER v MACOMBER, 252 US 189, 206 (1920):
"In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the Constitution may have
proper force and effect, save only as modified by the amendment, and that the latter also
may have proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is
not 'income, , as the term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise,
according to truth and substance, without regard to form. Congress cannot bv any
definition it may adopt conclude the matter. since it cannot bv legislation alter the
Constitution. from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose
limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised. "
This can be explained by the "sources of income" rulings by the Court. It is not necessary to go into
those arguments in depth. It is only necessary to understand that 'income' is a separate item from the
sources ofthat income. A source of income can be wages by which an emplover derives an income. As
an example, an employer may earn a profit from the leasing out of his employees or using his
employees to earn an income. An employee's wage is the source, not the income.
Ballard gives us two useful explanations at 404, "The general term 'income' is not defined in the
Internal Revenue Code. "
This is so because the only constitutional definition of "income" is stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
these previous rulings.
At 404, Ballard further ruled that
"... 'gross income' means the total sales, less the cost of goods sold, plus any income
from investments and from incidental or outside operations or sources. "
(For illustrative purpose, suppose a person worked for an employer and received wages for producing
widgets, and shortly after he began working there, there was a fire, destroying all the widgets that he
had produced. Thereafter, the company went out of business, and it is obvious that there was no "gross
income" under this Ballard ruling, because there were no sales.)
Affiant declares that Affiant, a natural human being and not a corporate entity, has had no
"income" as defined by the Supreme Court.
Fifth Consideration - The Laws
The question must be asked: Do the laws confonn to the Constitution?
The above Court rulings leave us with only the one alternative. The individual income tax, unless it is
imposed from the rule of Apportionment, falls outside the authorized taxation powers granted by the
Constitution, it being a direct tax on an individual's property.
Dwight E. Avis, Head of the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fireanns Bureau of Internal Revenue testified
under oath before Congress (2/3/53 - 2/13/53):
"Let me point this out now. This is where the structure differs. Your income tax is a
100% voluntary tax and your liquor tax (A. T.F.) is a 100% eriforced tax. Now the
situation is as different as night and day. Consequently, your same rules simply will not
16
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apply. "
To underscore that the laws conform to the constitution and are being misapplied by the IRS, look at
the definition of "employee" as given in 26 USC 3401 as:
(c) Employee
For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" includes an officer, employee, or
elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the
District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of anyone or more of the
foregoing. The term "employee" also includes an officer of a corporation.
The term "includes" means ONL Y those items listed, no implied items. That definition applies to 26
USC 3401 through 3406 of Chapter 24. Those code sections are fraudulently cited by the IRS as the
"requirement" for all private companies to have a W -4 form (certificate by employee) filed by
"employees" .
In a letter sent out by P. Rogers Operations Manager, IRS Collections, dated 07-05-2005, P. Rogers
falsely states:
"What Laws and Regulations Give Us Authority for the Withholding Compliance
Program?
The following are the cites for the laws and regulation that give us the authority for our
Withholding Compliance Program. Section 3402 and 3403 of the internal revenue code
(IRC), 26 USe. Sections 31. 3402(a)-1 through 31.3402(j)(6)-1 of the Treasury
Regulations, Title 26, Code of Federal Regulations (e.FR.), Part 31, as amended by
Treasury Decision (I'.D.) 9196, effective April 14,2005".
The IRS deliberately hides the proper application of said statutes by implying that it applies to subjects
not under Code jurisdiction. It would necessarily follow that if the private "employee" was not
required to file a W-4 form with the employer, then there would be no basis for a withholding from the
"employee's" paycheck. Actually, the IRS is authorized to require withholding under the quoted
statutes, but ONLY from federal corporate subjects as per the previous court rulings. They deliberately
deceive by "concealing the truth or withholding a material fact", the definition of fraud as found in
Black's Law Dictionary. This egregious violation is contrary to another Court ruling, GOULD v.
GOULD, 245 U.S. 151 (1917);
"In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend
their provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to
enlarge their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case
of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the
citizen. United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed Cas. No. 16,690; American
Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 US 468. 474. 12 S Sup. Ct. 55; Benziger v.
United States, 192 Us. 38. 55 . 24 S. Sup. Ct. 189. "
Affiant declares that Affiant is NOT an "employee" as defined in the Internal Revenue Code.
The laws can therefore be said to be in conformity with the Supreme Court rulings on the word
"income" and the 16th Amendment. However, the IRS deliberately obfuscates the true meaning.
The above cases and code sections are all Affiant would need to be exempt from the income tax if
Affiant didn't volunteer. Affiant declares Affiant has NOT "volunteered" to be a corporate entity
subject to the income tax. It can be shown that the statutes reflect the voluntary nature of the income
tax. The mandatory nature of the statutes, which are listed in the Internal Revenue Code, are missing
17
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and have been missing since 1954. There is no statute that causes the average human being including
Affiant to be liable for the income tax and no regulation that implements any such alleged statute.
A final court ruling is in order atthis point.
"(A) statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law. " Connally v General
Construction Co., 269 US 385, 391 (1926).
Affiant declares that if there is confusion as to the taxability of the rewards of Affiant's labor,
then the tax is null and void for violation of due process, as per the Court ruling above.
Affiant is left, inescapably, with these CONCLUSIONS.
1. The individual federal income tax is being imposed as a direct un-apportioned tax, except in
regard to corporations, which are engaged in a taxable corporate activity.
2 Affiant is free to volunteer or not volunteer to pay the direct tax imposed without
apportionment. AFFIANT DOES NOT AND HAS NOT EVER "VOLUNTEERED".
3. The individual income tax on citizens is constitutional, but only when it is apportioned.
4. The un-apportioned income tax on the individual, who lives and works in the 50 states, is not
authorized by the Constitution and falls into the category of a direct tax.
SUMMARY POINTS
The individual income tax is a direct tax subject to apportionment.
The corporate 'income' tax is an indirect tax, not subject to apportionment.
The 16th amendment only applies to 'income' as defined by the US Supreme Court, as pertaining
only to corporations.
The word 'income' is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code.
The 16th amendment did not authorize any new taxing powers.
The taxing powers of the federal government were the same after the passage of the 16th
amendment as were existent before the passage.
The 16th amendment kept the corporate excise tax in the category of indirect tax and did not
affect the apportionment requirement of the Constitution.
DISCLAIMER
Affiant reserves all rights under all forms oflaw, without prejudice. Affiant hereby refutes,
disclaims, and refuses any implied contract to which any mailing address, salutation, request,
demand, quote of statute, or presentation contained in this document may subject Affiant.
Affiant does not waive any Constitutional or Common Law rights. Affiant does not voluntarily
or involuntarily acquiesce into any foreign jurisdiction. Affiant hereby makes explicit
reservation of all rights and remedies. Affiant hereby declares and affirms, as God is my witness,
18
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'cotllu
oing is true and correct, having first hand knowledge of the facts on this /7
, 2006. Further, I, Affiant Dorenda Leigh Price Jones, do solemnly
- _.r¡ ""l"-:'¡
\)S~~J~üu
day of
attest t
ts herein are true, correct, and complete, to the best of my knowledge,
under penalty of perjury in accordance with the laws of God, the laws of the United States of
America, and the Law of Nations.
.(Jlfß!l,d ~!~ ~ ~L/
Dorenda Leigh rice Jones t/
Dat~/':?Ò(J ç,
State of Wyoming
)
) Affinn
)
JURAT
County of Lincoln
On this, the /7 day of , 2006 AD, Before me, a Notary Public, the signatory
Dorenda Leigh Price Jones p sonally peared, ~ known to me; or [] satisfactorily proven to be the
Natural Human Being whose name is ubscribed to this instrument, Sworn and acknowledged that
he/she executed the same for the stated purpose therein.
In Witness Where?f, I have hereunto set my hand and Notarial Seal.
My commission expires 7l ~ 2-2, 2-ðO 7-
~/)I
Notary ublic
KALONI HALL . NOTARY PUBUC
COUNTY OF 8\ STATE OF
UNCOLN ., WYOMING
I.4Y COMMISSION EXPIRES NOV. 22. 2009
19
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